THE SHADOW ECONOMY OUTSIDE TUNIS: HOW INFORMAL MARKETS AND BUSINESSES OPERATE BEYOND THE OFFICIAL STATISTICS

 

THE SHADOW ECONOMY OUTSIDE TUNIS

How Informal Markets and Businesses Operate Beyond the Official Statistics

By Barhoumi Mohamed Chaeib
Journalist & Researcher – Tunisia
ATEP MED – Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development

Introduction: The Economy That Exists Outside the Numbers

Walk through a weekly market in an interior Tunisian town and an economic reality quickly becomes visible.

There are traders selling clothing, food, agricultural products and household goods.

There are small transport operators, repair workers, seasonal labourers, street vendors, home-based producers and countless people earning an income without necessarily appearing in the same statistical and administrative categories as formally registered businesses.

This economy is not necessarily hidden in the physical sense.

It is visible everywhere.

What is less visible is its full economic weight.

How much money circulates through it?

How many people depend on it?

How many activities are registered?

How many workers have social protection?

How much tax revenue is potentially outside the formal system?

And why do so many people continue operating outside the formal economy?

These questions are particularly important outside Tunis, where formal employment opportunities and private-sector activity can be more limited and where informal activities can become an essential source of household income.

A Large Economy That Is Difficult to Measure

A major study published in March 2026 estimated the average size of Tunisia's shadow economy at 39.08% of GDP between 1988 and 2023. The researchers used a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes model and identified factors including tax pressure, unemployment, trade openness and corruption as among the causes associated with the shadow economy.

The study estimated higher levels during major economic shocks, including 41.70% during the 2011 Revolution period and 46.62% in 2020 during the COVID-19 crisis.

These figures should not be confused with an official measurement of the entire informal economy.

They are an academic estimate based on a specific methodology.

But they raise an important question for journalists:

If a significant part of economic activity is difficult to observe directly, what does the official economic picture leave out?

Beyond the Capital

The informal economy is not a single phenomenon.

It can take different forms depending on the region.

In agricultural areas, it can include seasonal agricultural labour, small-scale production and direct sales.

In towns, it can include market traders, small workshops, repair services, transport and street commerce.

In border regions, informal cross-border trade can become particularly important.

In poorer communities, informal work may simply be a survival strategy for people who cannot find formal employment.

This means that an investigation into informality cannot rely exclusively on statistics produced in Tunis.

It needs to go to the places where the economy operates.

The Market as an Economic Observatory

A weekly market can tell a journalist a great deal about the local economy.

Who sells?

Who buys?

Where do products come from?

How are they transported?

How many sellers have formal business registration?

How many issue invoices?

How many workers are employed?

How much does a trader typically sell in a normal day?

What are the main costs?

How much income remains?

Do sellers pay taxes or social contributions?

These questions should not be used to criminalize ordinary traders.

The purpose is to understand the economic system in which they operate.

A person selling agricultural products without a formal company structure may not see himself as part of a "shadow economy."

He may simply be trying to earn a living.

That distinction matters.

Informality and Employment

The informal economy is also an employment issue.

The International Labour Organization has emphasized that informal employment is widespread globally and is strongly associated with employment vulnerability and deficits in decent work.

For Tunisia, the ILO's labour statistics provide data on informal employment by sex, age and urban/rural status, among other dimensions.

A recent ILO supervisory document citing ILOSTAT data reported an informal employment rate of 58.7% in Tunisia in 2024, with a higher rate among young people.

The number is striking, but it also needs to be understood correctly.

Informal employment is not identical to the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP.

They are different statistical concepts.

One concerns employment and the nature of jobs; the other concerns economic activity that is not fully captured by formal measurement.

A serious investigation must keep these definitions separate.

The Young Worker Outside the Formal System

For many young people, the choice may not be between a formal job and an informal job.

It may be between informal work and no income at all.

A young person may work as a mechanic's assistant, sell goods in a market, provide transport services, work seasonally in agriculture or operate a small activity from home.

The work may generate income, but it may not provide the protections associated with formal employment.

There may be no pension contributions.

There may be no unemployment insurance.

There may be limited access to credit.

There may be no formal employment contract.

This creates a paradox.

The informal economy can provide employment where the formal economy does not provide enough jobs, while simultaneously leaving workers more vulnerable.

Small Businesses Facing a Difficult Choice

Informality is not only about workers.

It also concerns businesses.

A small entrepreneur may face registration procedures, taxes, accounting costs, social contributions and regulatory requirements.

For an established company, these costs may be manageable.

For a very small activity generating limited revenue, they can become a major barrier.

The result can be a cycle:

The activity remains small because it is informal.

Because it remains informal, access to finance can be limited.

Because access to finance is limited, the business cannot expand.

Because the business cannot expand, formalization may appear too expensive or risky.

The ILO has identified enterprise formalization as an important policy challenge and notes that informal enterprises are often characterized by low productivity and deficits in decent work, while also recommending measures that make registration cheaper, easier and more attractive.

The Border Economy

In some regions, informal economic activity has another dimension: cross-border trade.

Tunisia's border areas have long experienced informal trade influenced by price differences, taxes, subsidies and market conditions in neighbouring countries.

A World Bank analysis of Tunisia's informal cross-border trade found that differences in subsidy and tax regimes could create strong incentives for informal trade. It also noted that informal trade can generate employment for wholesalers, transporters and service providers.

The lesson is important.

Informal trade is not simply a question of individuals breaking rules.

It can also reflect economic incentives created by differences between markets.

If the price of the same product is dramatically different on two sides of a border, economic activity will tend to move toward that difference.

The journalist's task is to understand the mechanism.

Where Does the Money Go?

One of the central questions for our investigation should be the movement of money.

Suppose a trader purchases goods for 1,000 dinars and sells them for 1,300.

Where did the goods come from?

Who transported them?

Who stored them?

Who sold them to the trader?

How many people earned income during the process?

How much of the transaction was formally recorded?

How much entered the banking system?

How much was paid in taxes or social contributions?

And how much remained outside formal accounting?

This approach transforms the investigation from a general discussion about "informality" into an examination of an economic chain.

The Cost to the State

The informal economy can have consequences for public finances.

Businesses and workers operating outside the formal system may not contribute to taxation or social protection systems in the same way as formal enterprises and employees.

The International Labour Organization notes that informal enterprises generally do not generate public revenues in the same way as formal enterprises and can create unfair competitive pressures for formal businesses.

But the fiscal question should not be examined alone.

If informal activity disappeared tomorrow without creating alternative formal employment, thousands of households could lose income.

Therefore, the real policy challenge is not simply:

How can informal activity be eliminated?

It is:

How can viable economic activity move gradually into the formal economy without destroying the livelihoods that currently depend on it?

What Official Statistics Can and Cannot Tell Us

Official statistics remain essential.

The National Institute of Statistics publishes regular economic and social indicators and labour-market information.

But measuring informality is inherently difficult.

The ILO and OECD have noted that measuring informality in the MENA region is complicated by limited data collection and restricted access to microdata. Tunisia has made progress in measuring informal employment through its labour-force survey, but important limitations remain.

This creates an important opportunity for investigative journalism.

Journalists can complement official statistics with field evidence.

A market survey.

Interviews with traders.

Interviews with workers.

Business registration records.

Local tax information where accessible.

Transport observations.

Agricultural production data.

Household income stories.

Banking and payment trends where reliable aggregate information is available.

The goal is not to replace official statistics.

It is to help explain what the statistics cannot fully show.

The Women Who Work Without a Shop

Another part of the informal economy can remain almost invisible because it takes place inside homes.

Women may produce food products, clothing, handicrafts, agricultural goods or other products and sell them directly or through intermediaries.

The activity may generate income without becoming a registered enterprise.

This is particularly important in rural communities.

A woman may contribute substantially to household income while remaining statistically difficult to identify as an entrepreneur.

The investigation should therefore ask:

How many women participate in these activities?

What products do they make?

Who buys them?

How much do intermediaries earn?

What prevents formalization?

Could digital commerce provide a pathway into the formal economy?

Could cooperatives or social and solidarity economy structures provide alternatives?

These questions connect the informal economy with women's economic participation and regional development.

Digital Payments and the Informal Economy

The digital transformation of Tunisia's economy also creates a new question.

Can digital payments make informal economic activity more visible?

Can online commerce allow small producers to reach customers beyond their local markets?

Can electronic invoicing and digital administrative services reduce the cost of formalization?

The ILO has examined the relationship between technology, e-government and informality and found that digitalization can influence informality in different directions. Its research suggests that e-government can reduce informality in many cases, although technology can also create new forms of own-account work and informality.

This could become one of the most interesting dimensions of the investigation.

The informal economy may not simply be disappearing.

It may be changing.

The Field Investigation

To understand this economy, ATEP MED's investigation should eventually focus on several interior regions representing different economic realities.

For each location, the research team could document:

Type of informal activity

Number and profile of workers

Estimated daily or weekly turnover where participants voluntarily provide information

Supply sources

Customer profile

Employment conditions

Access to social protection

Relationship with formal businesses

Barriers to registration

Use of cash and digital payments

Relationship with local authorities

Economic importance to households

The investigation should combine interviews with available statistical and documentary evidence.

The People Behind the Statistics

Behind every percentage is a person.

The street vendor.

The seasonal agricultural worker.

The young mechanic.

The woman producing food at home.

The small transporter.

The market trader.

The repair worker.

The family running a small workshop.

They are not simply "the informal sector."

They are people navigating an economic system in which formal opportunities may not always be accessible.

Understanding their choices is essential to understanding Tunisia's economy.

Conclusion: An Economy That Cannot Simply Be Ignored

Tunisia's informal economy is neither a marginal phenomenon nor a simple story of illegal activity.

It is a complex economic reality involving workers, families, traders, small businesses, farmers, consumers and entire local markets.

Recent research suggests that the shadow economy represents a substantial share of Tunisia's economic activity, while labour statistics indicate a high level of informal employment.

Yet the most important part of the story cannot be found in a single percentage.

It is found in the markets and streets of Tunisia's interior regions.

It is found in the workshops, farms, homes, transport routes and small businesses where people create income every day.

The challenge for policymakers is to understand why people remain informal and how formalization can become economically attractive.

The challenge for journalists is different.

It is to make this invisible economy visible without stigmatizing the people who depend on it.

The question is therefore not simply:

How large is Tunisia's shadow economy?

The deeper question is:

What would happen to Tunisia's interior regions if this economy suddenly disappeared — and what would be required to bring its workers and businesses into a stronger, more secure and more productive formal economy?

That is the investigation that remains to be done.

By Barhoumi Mohamed Chaeib
Journalist & Researcher – Tunisia
ATEP MED – Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development

 

WHERE DO THE RESULTS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS GO AFTER THE FUNDING ENDS?

An Investigative Report on the Fate of State- and Internationally-Funded Development Projects in Tunisia's Interior Regions

By Barhoumi Mohamed Chaeib
Journalist & Researcher – Tunisia
ATEP MED – Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development

Introduction: The Question After the Project Ends

A development project usually has a clear beginning.

There is a funding agreement, a budget, an implementation period, a set of objectives and, eventually, an official completion date.

But what happens the day after the project ends?

Does the infrastructure continue to function?

Do the jobs created by the project survive?

Do local enterprises continue to operate?

Do farmers continue using the equipment and services provided?

Does the institution responsible for the project continue maintaining what was created?

And, most importantly, does the population continue to benefit from the investment several years later?

These questions are particularly important in Tunisia's interior regions, where development projects financed by the state and international partners are often presented as instruments for reducing regional disparities and strengthening local economies.

The question of sustainability therefore deserves to become an investigation in its own right.

Billions in Development, but What Remains?

Tunisia has a substantial portfolio of development projects supported by international financial institutions.

The World Bank's Tunisia portfolio alone included 169 projects with total commitments of approximately US$13.9 billion as of August 2026. Recent projects include programmes covering water security, irrigation, rural livelihoods and social development.

The African Development Bank's Tunisia portfolio lists 195 projects and more than UA 7.5 billion in commitments. Its project database also provides information on project status, financing and expected results.

These figures demonstrate the scale of development financing.

But financial volume is only one part of the story.

The more difficult question is what happens after implementation.

A project can be officially completed while its long-term impact remains uncertain.

Completion is not necessarily the same thing as sustainability.

Following a Project Beyond Its Official End Date

This investigation proposes a simple principle:

Do not stop following a development project when the donor stops financing it.

Instead, follow it for another two, three or five years whenever the available documentation allows.

Take a regional infrastructure project.

The official documentation may provide the original budget, implementation period, development objectives and expected beneficiaries.

But after completion, another set of questions becomes necessary.

Is the infrastructure still operational?

Who maintains it?

How much does maintenance cost?

Has the responsible institution allocated a budget for maintenance?

Are the original beneficiaries still using it?

Has the local economy changed as expected?

Have new businesses emerged?

Have employment opportunities been created?

If the project included training, are the people trained still using their skills?

These are the questions that can reveal whether development financing produced a lasting result or merely a temporary intervention.

The Difference Between Outputs and Impact

Development projects often measure outputs.

A road was constructed.

A water network was installed.

A number of farmers received training.

A number of enterprises received support.

A number of young people participated in a programme.

These are measurable achievements.

But they do not necessarily answer the larger question of impact.

A training programme may train hundreds of people, but how many subsequently find employment?

A local agricultural programme may introduce new products, but do farmers continue producing them after external technical assistance ends?

A project may create a processing facility, but does the facility remain operational when project financing disappears?

A public building may be completed, but who pays for maintenance and operation?

The difference between what was delivered and what survived is one of the central questions of this investigation.

Tunisia's Regional Development Challenge

The issue is especially relevant because regional disparities remain a major development challenge in Tunisia.

Recent World Bank documentation continues to identify disparities between lagging interior regions and more developed coastal areas.

The Tunisia Economic Development Corridor Project, for example, was designed to address regional economic disparities around the Kasserine–Sidi Bouzid–Sfax corridor by improving road transport access and access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises.

The project included US$168.05 million for corridor infrastructure development and US$47 million for corridor economic development. Yet the World Bank's October 2025 implementation report rated progress toward the development objective and overall implementation progress as moderately unsatisfactory at that stage.

This does not prove that the project failed.

It does, however, provide a legitimate starting point for journalistic investigation.

What happened afterward?

What obstacles affected implementation?

Which components progressed?

Which communities benefited?

What remains unfinished?

And what will remain five years after the financing period?

International Funding Does Not End With the Last Payment

Another important issue is the relationship between donor financing and local responsibility.

International development partners may finance infrastructure, technical assistance, training or institutional reform.

But once the project ends, national or regional institutions may become responsible for operation and maintenance.

This transition can determine whether a project produces durable benefits.

A newly constructed facility requires maintenance.

A water system requires management.

Agricultural equipment requires technical support and replacement parts.

Digital systems require updates.

Training programmes require institutions capable of continuing the work.

Without a sustainable institutional structure, a successful project at the moment of completion can gradually lose its effectiveness.

This is why the investigation should examine not only the original funding but also the post-project budget.

Where Does the Money Go After the Project?

Tunisia's Ministry of Finance provides a public dashboard for development-related expenditure.

The platform allows users to examine development expenditure by mission, programme, sub-programme and project grouping, and provides downloadable data in formats including XLSX, CSV and JSON.

This creates an important journalistic opportunity.

Instead of simply asking how much money was allocated to a development programme, journalists can attempt to follow the financial trail.

How much was allocated?

How much was actually spent?

When was it spent?

Was the project completed?

Were additional appropriations made?

Was the project transferred to another institution?

What expenditure followed after completion?

Was maintenance financed?

This is where data journalism and field reporting can work together.

The International Donor's Perspective

International organizations also conduct evaluations of their programmes.

The United Nations Development Programme's independent country programme evaluation of Tunisia for 2021–2025, published in February 2026, specifically examined UNDP's engagement and identified opportunities to strengthen sustainability, integration and learning across interventions.

Such evaluations provide journalists with an important source of information.

They can identify what worked, what did not work as expected, what lessons were learned and where implementation challenges occurred.

But an evaluation is not the end of the story.

It can become the beginning of a local investigation.

If an evaluation identifies a challenge, what does that challenge look like in a Tunisian village or town?

If a programme reports positive results, do beneficiaries still confirm those results several years later?

If a project is declared sustainable, what evidence demonstrates that sustainability?

A Project Can Be Successful — and Still Need Investigation

Investigative journalism should not assume failure.

This is particularly important when dealing with development projects.

A journalist should not begin with the conclusion that donor-funded projects waste money.

Some projects clearly produce substantial results.

For example, UNIDO reported in May 2026 that the second phase of its PAMPAT programme supported more than 250 enterprises and 1,000 farmers in Kairouan, Nabeul and Testour, contributing to 566 new products and more than 3,600 jobs.

These are significant reported results.

But even positive results create further journalistic questions.

How many of those jobs remain after the programme ends?

How many enterprises continue to operate?

What happens to the farmers after technical support is withdrawn?

Are the products still being marketed?

Has the local value chain become self-sustaining?

The purpose of investigation is therefore not to attack development programmes.

It is to determine what remains after the external intervention ends.

The Field Test

The most important part of this investigation should eventually take place outside Tunis.

The research team can select a number of completed or recently completed projects in interior regions.

For each project, the investigation can create a simple post-project profile:

Project name

Location

Funding source

Original budget

Implementation period

Original objectives

Number of intended beneficiaries

Official results

Current status

Current operator

Maintenance arrangements

Current beneficiaries

Evidence from the field

Documents obtained

Unanswered questions

This methodology makes the investigation concrete.

Instead of discussing development in abstract terms, it follows individual projects.

The Voices of the Beneficiaries

Official reports provide one side of the story.

The people who live with the project every day provide another.

Farmers can explain whether agricultural support continues to benefit them.

Young entrepreneurs can explain whether business-support programmes created sustainable opportunities.

Residents can explain whether infrastructure improved their daily lives.

Local officials can explain the difficulties of operation and maintenance.

Civil society organizations can provide independent observations.

Contractors and implementing agencies can explain technical and administrative challenges.

International partners can be asked to respond to findings.

A strong investigation brings these perspectives together.

The Question of Visibility

There is another interesting dimension.

Some internationally financed projects are not always publicly recognized as international development projects.

A 2026 analysis by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs noted that European-funded projects in Tunisia can remain relatively invisible to the public, while other foreign-funded initiatives may receive greater public visibility.

This raises another question for journalists:

Does the public know who financed a project?

Does it know how much was invested?

Does it know which institution is responsible?

Does it know what results were promised?

And does it know how to evaluate whether those promises were fulfilled?

Development transparency is not only about money.

It is also about information.

From Funding to Long-Term Value

The central argument of this investigation is simple:

A development project should not be judged only by the amount of money invested or the number of activities completed.

Its long-term value matters.

A project that creates a functioning institution, sustainable employment, productive infrastructure or a continuing local economic activity can generate benefits long after the original financing ends.

But a project that depends permanently on external financing may face difficulties once the donor withdraws.

The distinction is crucial.

Conclusion: The Second Life of Development Projects

Every development project has an official life.

There is a launch date.

There is a funding agreement.

There are activities.

There are reports.

There is a closing ceremony.

Then comes the most important period for citizens:

What happens next?

The real test of development is not always visible on the day a project is inaugurated.

It can be seen years later.

Does the infrastructure still work?

Does the enterprise still exist?

Are people still employed?

Are farmers still benefiting?

Is the service still available?

Who pays for maintenance?

Who monitors the results?

And can the public still access information about the project?

These questions deserve systematic investigation in Tunisia's interior regions.

The objective is not to prejudge the success or failure of any project.

It is to compare promises with results, budgets with expenditure, official reports with field reality, and short-term achievements with long-term sustainability.

For journalism, this means following the money beyond the funding period.

For citizens, it means asking what remains after the cameras leave.

And for development policy, it means recognizing that the true measure of an investment may begin after the project officially ends.

By Barhoumi Mohamed Chaeib
Journalist & Researcher – Tunisia
ATEP MED – Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development

 

WHO OWNS THE INFORMATION IN TUNISIA?

An Investigation into Access to Public Data, Public Money and Government Projects

By Barhoumi Mohamed Chaeib
Journalist & Researcher – Tunisia
ATEP MED – Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development

Introduction: A Right That Exists on Paper

In a modern state, information about public money should not belong exclusively to government offices, administrative departments or officials.

It belongs, in principle, to the public.

Every dinar allocated to a public project, every major public investment, every infrastructure programme and every development initiative raises a legitimate question: what was planned, how much was allocated, who implemented it, what was achieved and what happened afterward?

For journalists, researchers and citizens, these questions are not simply matters of curiosity. They are part of the public interest.

Tunisia has established a legal framework recognizing the right of access to information. Organic Law No. 2016-22 of 24 March 2016 explicitly aims to guarantee access to information, strengthen transparency and accountability, improve public services and support public participation in public policy. The law applies to a broad range of public bodies, including ministries, public institutions, regional and local public structures and other entities covered by its provisions.

Yet the existence of a legal right does not automatically mean that obtaining information is always simple, rapid or practical.

This is where the real journalistic question begins.

The Information Behind Public Money

A public project rarely begins with construction.

Before a road is built, a hospital is renovated, a water network is extended or a regional development programme is launched, there are decisions, budgets, studies, contracts, schedules and administrative documents.

These documents tell the story of public expenditure.

They can reveal the original objective of a project, the estimated cost, the implementation timetable, the responsible institution and, in many cases, the results expected from the investment.

Tunisia's access-to-information legislation specifically provides for the publication of information concerning public programmes, budgets, achievements, public procurement and its implementation results, as well as information concerning public finances and public expenditure.

This creates an important principle for investigative journalism:

A journalist should not have to begin with rumours when documents can provide evidence.

The challenge, however, is knowing where the information is, whether it has been published, whether it is updated and how easily it can be obtained.

When the Citizen Becomes a Researcher

The right to information is not reserved for professional journalists.

Under Tunisia's legal framework, any natural or legal person may submit a written request for access to information. The applicant is not required to explain why the information is being requested. The law also provides different forms of access, including consultation, paper copies, electronic copies where possible and extracts.

This is significant.

A citizen who wants to understand a local development project should theoretically be able to ask for information.

A researcher studying regional inequalities should be able to request relevant documents.

A journalist investigating public expenditure should be able to seek records that help verify claims.

The question is therefore no longer simply whether the right exists.

The deeper question is:

How effectively can this right be used in practice?

The Distance Between a Legal Right and Practical Access

There is often a difference between having information available somewhere in the administrative system and making that information genuinely accessible.

A document may exist but not be easy to locate.

A public institution may publish information but not necessarily in the format most useful for analysis.

A project may be mentioned in a general report without providing all the details necessary to understand its actual implementation.

A budget figure may be available without sufficient information to connect it to a specific project or geographic area.

For investigative journalism, these differences matter.

A journalist does not simply need a number.

The journalist needs to know what the number represents.

Was it an initial allocation or the final expenditure?

Was the project completed?

Was the original timetable respected?

Was the contract modified?

Were additional funds allocated?

Was the infrastructure actually delivered?

Is it operating today?

These questions transform a document into an investigation.

Public Procurement: Following the Paper Trail

Public procurement is one of the areas where access to information can become particularly important.

A public contract can involve significant amounts of public money. The journalist's role is not automatically to accuse anyone of wrongdoing.

The role is to follow the available evidence.

Who announced the project?

What was the estimated cost?

What was the procurement procedure?

Who was selected?

What were the contractual deadlines?

Was the project completed?

Were amendments made?

Were additional expenditures recorded?

Were the expected results achieved?

These questions can be asked without assuming that irregularities exist.

That distinction is essential.

Good investigative journalism does not begin with a conclusion and then search for evidence.

It begins with a question and follows the evidence wherever it leads.

The Problem of Fragmented Information

One of the practical challenges facing researchers and journalists is that information can be distributed across different institutions and documents.

A development project may involve a ministry, a regional authority, a local structure, a public institution, a contractor and possibly an international financing partner.

Each may hold part of the story.

The journalist must therefore reconstruct the complete picture.

This is where research becomes more than collecting documents.

It becomes the work of connecting them.

One document may reveal the budget.

Another may reveal the timetable.

A third may provide the procurement information.

A fourth may describe the expected results.

Field reporting can then determine whether the situation on the ground corresponds to the documentary record.

The investigation is created by bringing these elements together.

The Role of Digital Transparency

The digital age has changed the relationship between citizens and public institutions.

A government website can potentially make thousands of documents accessible to citizens without requiring them to visit an administrative office.

Tunisia's access-to-information law provides for public bodies to publish and regularly update certain categories of information on their websites. It also requires information concerning access procedures and the officials responsible for handling access requests to be made available.

But digital publication alone is not enough.

Information must also be understandable, searchable, sufficiently detailed and usable.

A PDF containing hundreds of pages may technically be public, but a researcher may still face considerable difficulty extracting the information necessary for a specific investigation.

Open government is therefore not simply about putting documents online.

It is also about making information usable.

What Happens When Information Is Refused?

The law recognizes that access to information is not unlimited.

Certain exceptions exist, including situations involving national security and defence, international relations, privacy, personal data and intellectual property rights.

These exceptions are legitimate areas requiring careful consideration.

But they also make an important distinction necessary.

A refusal should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of corruption.

Likewise, the existence of a restriction should not automatically mean that the entire subject is inaccessible.

For journalists, the task is to determine precisely what information is restricted, why it is restricted and whether other non-restricted information can still be obtained.

This is why knowledge of access-to-information procedures is increasingly part of professional investigative journalism.

From Request to Investigation

An effective investigation can begin with a simple sequence.

First, identify a public-interest question.

Second, identify the institution responsible.

Third, determine what information should already be publicly available.

Fourth, submit precise requests for missing information.

Fifth, document the response.

Sixth, compare official information with other documentary sources.

Seventh, conduct interviews.

Eighth, visit the field where appropriate.

Finally, give the relevant institutions and individuals an opportunity to respond before publication.

This methodology protects both the journalist and the public.

It reduces dependence on anonymous claims.

It creates a documentary trail.

And it makes the final story stronger.

Why Access to Information Matters for Regional Journalism

The issue becomes particularly important outside the capital.

Regional journalism often has fewer resources than national media.

Yet citizens in interior regions also need information about public investment, infrastructure, health, education, transport, agriculture, water and employment.

A local road project may appear to be a small story from the perspective of national politics.

For the community concerned, it may be one of the most important public investments in its daily life.

The same applies to a health centre, school, water network, agricultural project or local economic programme.

Regional journalism can therefore turn administrative documents into stories that directly concern citizens.

The Unanswered Question

So, who owns the information in Tunisia?

Legally, the answer is not that information about public affairs belongs exclusively to the administration.

The 2016 access-to-information law establishes a right for persons to obtain information and explicitly links that right to transparency, accountability, public participation and research.

But the practical question remains more complex:

Can citizens and journalists obtain the information they need in a form that allows them to understand, verify and investigate public affairs effectively?

That is the question that deserves deeper field investigation.

The next stage is not another general discussion about transparency.

It is to test the system.

Select real public projects.

Identify the documents that should exist.

Submit documented requests.

Record the responses.

Measure delays and gaps.

Compare official records with what exists on the ground.

Interview citizens, journalists, researchers and public officials.

And publish the results.

Conclusion: Information Is the Beginning of Accountability

Public accountability cannot function effectively without information.

A citizen cannot meaningfully evaluate a public project without knowing what was promised.

A journalist cannot properly investigate public expenditure without access to documentary evidence.

A researcher cannot study development policy without reliable data.

And public institutions themselves benefit from clear and accessible information because transparency can strengthen public confidence and improve the quality of public debate.

Tunisia already possesses an important legal foundation for access to information.

The challenge for the coming years is to transform the principle into everyday practice.

For journalists, this means developing a stronger culture of document-based reporting.

For citizens, it means understanding that requesting information is part of civic participation.

For public institutions, it means treating accessible public information not as a favour granted to the public, but as an essential component of transparent administration.

And for investigative journalism, the lesson is simple:

Do not begin by asking who is guilty. Begin by asking what the documents say.

That is where serious journalism begins.

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By Barhoumi Mohamed Chaeib
Journalist & Researcher – Tunisia
ATEP MED – Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development

 

From War to Reconstruction: Who Controls Economic Decision-Making in the New Syria, and Who Will Pay for Rebuilding?

By Mohamed Chaieb – ATEP MED / Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development

Syria has moved from a devastating period of war into a new and extraordinarily difficult phase: reconstruction.

But rebuilding a country after more than a decade of conflict is not simply a matter of repairing buildings, roads, electricity networks and public institutions.

Behind every reconstruction project lies a more fundamental question:

Who decides what Syria's economic priorities should be, who controls the resources, and who ultimately pays the cost of rebuilding the country?

This question has become increasingly important as Syria seeks to restore economic activity, attract investment, rebuild public institutions and reconnect with regional and international markets.

The scale of the challenge is enormous.

The World Bank estimates Syria's post-conflict physical reconstruction needs at approximately US$216 billion, based on damage accumulated between 2011 and 2024. Nearly one-third of the country's pre-conflict capital stock was damaged, with infrastructure representing the largest share of physical destruction.

This figure immediately raises another question:

Where can Syria obtain the money?

The Syrian state does not possess the fiscal capacity to finance reconstruction on this scale by itself.

External donors, regional governments, international financial institutions, foreign investors, Syrian businesses and the Syrian diaspora will therefore all potentially have a role.

But financing reconstruction is not the same as deciding how reconstruction should be organized.

The relationship between political authority, economic institutions, international donors and private investors will shape the country's economic future.

A new economic decision-making environment

The fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in December 2024 fundamentally changed Syria's political and economic environment.

The new authorities inherited an economy deeply damaged by war, sanctions, institutional fragmentation, declining production, weak public finances and deteriorated infrastructure.

The International Monetary Fund reported in 2026 that Syria's economy had begun to recover, supported by improving investor and consumer confidence, refugee returns, increased electricity provision, agriculture, trade and services. It also said that the authorities were pursuing a private-sector-led recovery.

This represents a significant change in the economic direction of the country.

But a transition toward a more market-oriented economy creates difficult policy questions.

How quickly should markets be liberalized?

Which state-owned companies should remain public?

Which should be privatized?

How should foreign investors be regulated?

How should strategic infrastructure be managed?

What should happen to subsidies?

How should reconstruction contracts be awarded?

And how can the government ensure that economic growth benefits regions and households that suffered most during the war?

These questions will help determine who actually shapes Syria's economic future.

The state remains the central economic actor

Despite the movement toward greater private-sector participation, the Syrian state remains central to reconstruction.

It controls public expenditure.

It determines regulations.

It manages taxation.

It oversees public institutions.

It controls important infrastructure.

It negotiates with international organizations.

And it establishes the legal framework under which foreign and domestic investors operate.

The government's ability to manage these responsibilities will therefore be crucial.

The World Bank approved a US$20 million grant in March 2026 to strengthen Syria's public financial management, procurement, budget controls, digitalization and institutional coordination. The World Bank described stronger and more transparent management of public funds as essential to rebuilding confidence among citizens and international partners.

This is more than an administrative reform.

It concerns the fundamental question of how reconstruction money will be managed.

Who controls reconstruction funds?

Reconstruction financing may eventually come from several sources.

International development institutions.

Foreign governments.

Regional funds.

Private investors.

Syrian businesses.

The diaspora.

Humanitarian organizations.

And eventually, the Syrian government's own revenues.

Each source comes with different expectations.

International financial institutions may emphasize fiscal transparency and institutional reform.

Foreign investors may prioritize commercial returns.

Donors may prioritize social needs and infrastructure.

The Syrian government may prioritize sovereignty, employment and economic growth.

Citizens may prioritize housing, electricity, healthcare, education and employment.

These priorities do not always coincide.

This makes the coordination of reconstruction particularly important.

International institutions and economic policy

The World Bank and IMF are not the Syrian government.

They do not formally replace national decision-making.

Their role is different.

They provide financing, technical assistance, economic analysis and institutional support.

The IMF's engagement with Syria in 2026 has focused on macroeconomic policy, fiscal management, revenue mobilization, banking-sector rehabilitation, economic statistics and institutional capacity.

The World Bank, meanwhile, is supporting public financial management and assessing reconstruction needs.

Their involvement means that international standards and policy recommendations will inevitably influence the reconstruction process.

The central issue is therefore not simply whether international institutions participate.

It is how their technical assistance and financing are incorporated into Syrian national priorities.

The Gulf and regional investment

Regional Arab countries are also likely to have an important role in Syria's reconstruction.

The Gulf possesses substantial financial resources and major investment companies capable of financing infrastructure, real estate, energy, logistics, tourism and telecommunications.

This could provide Syria with capital that the state itself cannot generate.

But investment is different from aid.

An investor normally expects a financial return.

A development project may generate public benefits without producing immediate commercial profits.

This creates a policy challenge.

Syria will need both commercial investment and development financing.

They should not be treated as identical.

Foreign investment: opportunity and question

Foreign investment can accelerate reconstruction.

A foreign company can bring:

Capital.

Technology.

Management expertise.

International markets.

Employment.

And supply-chain connections.

But large foreign investments also raise questions about ownership and strategic assets.

Who owns the infrastructure?

What percentage of the project remains under Syrian ownership?

How are profits distributed?

How many Syrian workers are employed?

How much technology is transferred?

How long are concessions granted?

What happens when the contract ends?

These questions are not arguments against foreign investment.

They are questions of economic governance.

A transparent investment framework can allow Syria to attract capital while protecting public interests.

The Syrian private sector

Syria's domestic businesses will also have an important role.

Thousands of companies and entrepreneurs survived years of conflict under extremely difficult conditions.

They possess local knowledge.

They understand regional markets.

They know local supply chains.

And they can create employment quickly.

Small and medium-sized businesses may be particularly important because reconstruction cannot be carried out entirely by large international companies.

A functioning reconstruction strategy should therefore enable Syrian companies to compete for contracts and become suppliers to larger projects.

Who pays the cost?

The question of who pays for reconstruction is more complicated than it first appears.

There will probably not be one single source of financing.

The cost may be distributed among:

The Syrian state.

International donors.

Regional governments.

Development institutions.

Foreign investors.

Syrian businesses.

The diaspora.

And, indirectly, Syrian households through taxes, fees and utility prices.

This final element deserves particular attention.

A government can receive external financing, but it still needs domestic revenues to operate the state.

The question is how much of the long-term cost will ultimately be carried by Syrian citizens.

The fiscal capacity of the state

Syria enters reconstruction with very limited fiscal resources.

The World Bank reports that government revenue collection fell from nearly 20 percent of GDP before the conflict to less than 5 percent, reflecting reduced oil and tax revenues and weak customs collection.

This means that the state cannot simply increase public spending indefinitely.

It must rebuild its revenue system.

That requires better tax administration, customs collection and public financial management.

But raising taxes too quickly could place additional pressure on households and businesses.

The government therefore faces a difficult balance:

increase revenue without suffocating the recovery.

The citizen as an indirect financier

Citizens may contribute to reconstruction through taxation.

They may also face changes in subsidies and public-service pricing.

The IMF reported in August 2026 that higher utility prices were part of efforts to move toward cost recovery and reduce quasi-fiscal costs, while noting that poverty remained widespread.

This illustrates the social dimension of economic reform.

From the government's perspective, higher prices for certain public services can reduce financial losses.

From the household's perspective, higher prices can increase the cost of living.

This is why reconstruction policy cannot be evaluated only through fiscal indicators.

It must also consider household purchasing power.

Subsidies and the cost of reform

Subsidies are among the most politically sensitive economic questions in any country emerging from crisis.

They can protect households from high prices.

But they can also impose a major burden on public finances.

The challenge is determining which subsidies should remain, which should be redesigned and how vulnerable households can be protected.

Removing subsidies without adequate social protection can increase hardship.

Maintaining every subsidy indefinitely can undermine fiscal sustainability.

A targeted social-protection system could therefore become an important part of the transition.

The banking system and reconstruction finance

Another fundamental question concerns the banking sector.

Reconstruction requires financing.

Businesses need loans.

Investors need payment systems.

Citizens need secure banking services.

International companies need mechanisms for transferring money.

The IMF has identified urgent banking-sector rehabilitation as one of Syria's key economic priorities in 2026.

Without a functioning banking sector, reconstruction will remain heavily dependent on cash, external financing and informal arrangements.

A rehabilitated financial system could help turn reconstruction spending into broader domestic investment.

Public procurement: where money meets power

One of the most important questions in reconstruction is how contracts are awarded.

Large reconstruction contracts can be worth millions or even billions of dollars.

The system used to award them can determine who benefits economically.

Transparent competitive procurement can allow qualified companies to compete.

Weak procurement systems can increase the risk of inefficient spending and concentration of economic opportunities.

This is why the World Bank's public financial management project places particular emphasis on procurement, budget controls, financial reporting and institutional coordination.

For Syria, procurement reform is therefore not a technical detail.

It is part of the architecture of economic governance.

Who owns the reconstruction economy?

A further question will emerge as reconstruction accelerates:

Who will own the new Syrian economy?

Will major infrastructure remain primarily public?

Will foreign companies dominate strategic sectors?

Will Syrian businesses regain a larger role?

Will public enterprises be privatized?

Will partnerships between Syrian and foreign companies become the dominant model?

There is no single automatic answer.

Different sectors may require different ownership structures.

But the rules should be transparent.

Privatization and state-owned companies

Syria inherited a large public-sector economic structure from the previous system.

Some state-owned enterprises may require restructuring.

Others may be economically viable.

Some may need new management or investment.

Others may not be sustainable in their existing form.

Privatization can potentially bring capital and management expertise.

But privatization also raises questions concerning valuation, competition, employment and ownership concentration.

If state assets are sold, the process needs transparent valuation and competitive procedures.

Otherwise, privatization can simply transfer public assets into private hands without creating sufficient public benefit.

Economic liberalization and domestic industry

Syria's current economic transition includes a move toward greater market openness.

The Financial Times reported on September 30, 2026 that the new authorities have rapidly liberalized trade and moved toward a more market-oriented economic model, while Syrian manufacturers have faced stronger foreign competition.

This presents a genuine economic dilemma.

Opening markets can reduce prices and increase competition.

It can also expose domestic industries that have survived under protection to sudden competition from imports.

The question therefore becomes:

How fast should economic liberalization proceed?

A successful transition may require sequencing reforms so that domestic companies have time to improve productivity and compete.

Reconstruction versus economic transformation

Reconstruction and economic reform are not necessarily the same thing.

Reconstruction means restoring what was destroyed.

Economic transformation means creating a different and potentially more productive economy.

Syria needs both.

Rebuilding an old factory may restore employment.

But modernizing the factory may create greater productivity.

Rebuilding an old electricity system may restore supply.

But developing a more diversified energy system may reduce future vulnerability.

Rebuilding roads may restore transport.

But connecting roads to modern logistics networks can create new economic opportunities.

The question is therefore not simply:

How can Syria rebuild?

It is:

What kind of economy should Syria build?

Regional development

Syria's reconstruction will also have a geographical dimension.

The needs of Damascus are different from those of Aleppo.

The needs of agricultural areas differ from those of industrial cities.

Border regions have different opportunities from coastal areas.

The World Bank's reconstruction assessment identifies Aleppo, Rif Dimashq and Homs among the governorates with the greatest reconstruction needs.

Regional development strategies should therefore reflect local economic conditions.

Agricultural areas may require irrigation, roads and food processing.

Industrial areas may require factories, electricity and logistics.

Cities may require housing, transport and public services.

Border regions may benefit from trade and logistics.

The return of Syrians and the economic equation

The return of Syrians from abroad could significantly affect reconstruction.

The IMF reported that approximately 1.5 million refugees had returned by 2026, contributing to domestic demand.

But return creates additional economic requirements.

Returning families need:

Housing.

Schools.

Healthcare.

Employment.

Transport.

Water.

Electricity.

And administrative services.

The return of people can therefore become a major economic asset if the country can integrate them into productive activity.

The diaspora as investor

The Syrian diaspora could play another role.

Syrians living abroad possess financial capital, professional experience and international business networks.

They can potentially invest in:

Manufacturing.

Agriculture.

Tourism.

Technology.

Healthcare.

Education.

Construction.

And professional services.

But diaspora investment requires confidence.

Investors need predictable regulations, secure property rights, functioning banks and reliable dispute-resolution mechanisms.

Rebuilding confidence is therefore essential for mobilizing diaspora capital.

International donors and conditions

Donor financing may also influence economic priorities.

Donors normally want evidence that funds are being used effectively.

They may require transparency, monitoring and reporting.

Development institutions may link support to institutional reforms.

These conditions are not necessarily equivalent to political control.

But they can influence the direction and sequencing of economic reforms.

This makes coordination between Syrian institutions and international partners particularly important.

Who decides the economic priorities?

Ultimately, economic priorities must be established through Syrian institutions.

But the practical decision-making environment will include multiple actors:

The government.

The central bank.

The Ministry of Finance.

Other economic ministries.

Local authorities.

Private businesses.

International financial institutions.

Regional investors.

Donors.

And civil society.

The more complex the financing structure becomes, the more important institutional coordination will be.

Without coordination, different projects may compete with each other or fail to address the country's most urgent needs.

Public financial management as the foundation

This explains why the World Bank's 2026 project on public financial management is significant.

The project is intended to strengthen:

Budget preparation.

Budget execution.

Procurement.

Financial reporting.

Digitalization.

Oversight.

And institutional coordination.

These are the mechanisms through which a state turns financial resources into public policy.

A country may receive billions in reconstruction financing.

But without effective financial management, money does not automatically produce development.

What should reconstruction prioritize?

A national reconstruction strategy could reasonably place emphasis on several interconnected areas:

Electricity and energy

Without reliable energy, industrial and digital recovery will remain difficult.

Water

Water infrastructure is essential for households, agriculture and industry.

Housing

Millions of people need safe and adequate housing.

Transport

Roads and logistics are necessary for domestic trade.

Healthcare

Health services are essential to social recovery.

Education

Human capital is necessary for long-term economic development.

Agriculture

Agriculture can support employment and food security.

Industry

Manufacturing can create productive employment and exports.

Digital infrastructure

Digital systems can accelerate both public administration and private-sector development.

The reconstruction multiplier

The greatest economic benefit will come if reconstruction spending creates secondary economic activity.

For example:

A road project employs construction workers.

Those workers spend money locally.

Local businesses provide food and services.

Transport companies supply materials.

Manufacturers produce construction inputs.

Banks finance businesses.

Government collects taxes.

The original investment therefore creates a multiplier effect.

The challenge is to ensure that as much of this value as possible remains within Syria.

Local procurement and Syrian companies

One practical mechanism is local procurement.

International contractors can work with Syrian companies.

Foreign investors can establish partnerships with local firms.

International development projects can create opportunities for qualified Syrian SMEs.

Training programs can prepare local workers.

This would allow foreign capital and expertise to coexist with domestic economic participation.

The risk of unequal reconstruction

There is another important issue.

Reconstruction could potentially benefit some regions, sectors and groups much faster than others.

Capital cities and major commercial centers may attract investment first.

Areas with weaker infrastructure may wait longer.

Large companies may have easier access to financing than small enterprises.

Skilled workers may benefit more quickly than low-income households.

This could widen economic inequalities unless reconstruction policy deliberately includes less-developed regions and vulnerable groups.

Social protection and economic reform

The reconstruction process will inevitably involve economic reforms.

But reforms can impose short-term costs.

Prices may change.

Subsidies may be reduced.

Taxes may increase.

State-owned companies may be restructured.

Public employment may change.

These measures can be necessary for long-term sustainability, but their social consequences must be addressed.

The IMF itself emphasizes the need to protect social spending and strengthen safety nets while improving public-finance efficiency.

The question of sovereignty

Economic reconstruction also raises a question of sovereignty.

Foreign capital is necessary at the scale of Syria's reconstruction challenge.

But a country's economic sovereignty depends partly on its ability to establish its own rules, negotiate contracts and determine its development priorities.

The objective should therefore not be isolation from foreign investment.

Nor should it be complete dependence on foreign capital.

The challenge is to build partnerships in which external financing contributes to Syrian development while Syrian institutions retain a meaningful role in determining national priorities.

A possible reconstruction model

A balanced reconstruction model could combine several sources:

Public investment for essential infrastructure.

International development finance for reconstruction and institutional capacity.

Private investment for commercially viable projects.

Regional Arab investment for infrastructure, energy, logistics and other sectors.

Diaspora investment for SMEs and productive industries.

International grants for social services and vulnerable communities.

Such diversification could reduce dependence on any single source.

From financing to ownership

The ultimate question is not simply:

Who pays?

It is also:

Who benefits?

A reconstruction project financed by foreign capital can still create substantial benefits for Syria if it generates employment, transfers technology, strengthens local suppliers and improves infrastructure.

Conversely, a project financed publicly can produce limited development benefits if it is inefficiently managed.

The quality of governance therefore matters as much as the source of financing.

Measuring reconstruction

Syria will need transparent indicators to measure progress.

Not simply:

How much money was received?

But:

How much was invested?

How many jobs were created?

How many Syrian companies participated?

How much infrastructure was restored?

How much private investment was mobilized?

How much agricultural production increased?

How much electricity became available?

How many people returned to productive employment?

How much poverty declined?

And how efficiently were public funds managed?

These indicators would help citizens and international partners understand whether reconstruction is producing genuine economic recovery.

The deeper question: what kind of state?

The reconstruction process will ultimately reveal what kind of economic state Syria intends to become.

Will it remain heavily dependent on state-owned enterprises?

Will it move toward a predominantly market-based model?

Will it create a mixed economy?

Will strategic sectors remain publicly controlled while competitive sectors become more open to private investment?

The current transition suggests greater emphasis on private-sector-led growth, but the final institutional model will depend on decisions made over the coming years. The IMF explicitly describes the current policy direction as aiming for a strong, private-sector-led recovery.

Conclusion: The cost of rebuilding is financial—and institutional

Syria's reconstruction is one of the largest economic challenges facing the Middle East.

The World Bank estimates the physical reconstruction bill at approximately US$216 billion.

No single institution can finance this amount.

No single country can rebuild Syria alone.

And no single economic sector can carry the recovery.

The reconstruction process will therefore require cooperation among Syrian institutions, international financial organizations, regional governments, foreign investors, Syrian businesses, the diaspora and local communities.

But money alone will not determine the outcome.

The decisive issue will be how the money is governed.

Who decides the priorities?

Who receives the contracts?

Who owns the assets?

Who creates the jobs?

Who pays the taxes?

Who carries the social cost of reform?

And who benefits from economic growth?

These questions should be at the center of Syria's reconstruction debate.

The World Bank's support for public financial management and the IMF's emphasis on fiscal reform, banking rehabilitation, statistics and private-sector-led growth demonstrate that institutional capacity is already becoming a central component of the reconstruction process.

Syria therefore faces a dual reconstruction challenge.

It must rebuild what the war destroyed.

But it must also build the economic institutions capable of managing the future.

If reconstruction creates only new buildings, it will remain incomplete.

If it creates functioning institutions, productive businesses, employment, reliable public services and greater confidence, it can become the foundation of a much broader economic transformation.

The ultimate question is therefore not simply who will pay for rebuilding Syria.

It is:

Will the resources mobilized for reconstruction create an economy in which Syrians themselves become active participants in rebuilding their country's future?

That may be the most important economic question facing Syria's new era.

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Keywords: Syria reconstruction, Syria new economy, Syria economic transition, Syria investment, Syria reconstruction financing, Syria public finance, Syria private sector, Syria foreign investment, Syria Gulf investment, Syria diaspora investment, Syria banking sector, Syria infrastructure, Syria economic reform, Syria development, Syria jobs, Syria SMEs, Syria public administration, Syria governance, Syria World Bank, Syria IMF, Syria post-war economy, Syria rebuilding

Sources: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Financial Times.

ATEP MED – Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development
Written and published by Mohamed Chaieb
atepmed@gmail.com

 

Syria After the Fall of Assad: Challenges of Rebuilding the State, the Economy and Public Administration Institutions

By Mohamed Chaieb – ATEP MED / Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development

Syria has entered a fundamentally different historical phase following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in December 2024.

After fourteen years of conflict, economic contraction, institutional fragmentation, displacement and the destruction of large parts of the country's infrastructure, the new authorities face a task that goes far beyond rebuilding roads, houses and electricity networks.

The central challenge is to rebuild the capacity of the Syrian state itself.

This means rebuilding public institutions, restoring administrative systems, improving public financial management, rebuilding essential services, establishing reliable economic statistics, restoring confidence in banks and creating the conditions for private investment and employment.

The scale of the reconstruction challenge is enormous.

The World Bank estimates Syria's physical reconstruction needs at approximately US$216 billion, based on damage accumulated between 2011 and 2024. The assessment indicates that nearly one-third of Syria's pre-conflict capital stock was damaged, with infrastructure accounting for the largest share of physical damage.

But physical reconstruction is only one part of the problem.

The country also needs institutional reconstruction.

The state after fourteen years of conflict

Long conflicts do not destroy only buildings.

They disrupt institutions.

Administrative procedures become fragmented.

Public records may be incomplete.

Government databases deteriorate.

Budget systems weaken.

Public services become uneven.

Professional capacity is lost through displacement and migration.

And citizens become accustomed to finding alternative mechanisms for accessing basic services.

Syria therefore faces the difficult task of rebuilding a functioning public administration while simultaneously responding to urgent humanitarian and economic needs.

The United Nations' 2026 Common Country Analysis identifies the transition from humanitarian response toward recovery, reconstruction and long-term development as one of the central challenges facing Syria, while highlighting trust-building as a cross-cutting priority.

Rebuilding institutions before rebuilding everything

A country cannot effectively manage reconstruction without institutions capable of managing money, contracts, public projects and services.

This is why institutional reform must accompany physical reconstruction.

A new road requires procurement procedures.

A new hospital requires budgeting, staffing and management.

A rebuilt electricity network requires regulation and maintenance.

A school requires teachers, salaries and administrative supervision.

A water system requires investment and a functioning public authority.

In other words:

Reconstruction requires a state capable of managing reconstruction.

This makes public administration one of the most important sectors in Syria's recovery.

Public financial management

One of the clearest examples is public financial management.

In March 2026, the World Bank approved a US$20 million grant to strengthen Syria's public financial management capacity.

The project focuses on budget preparation and execution, procurement, financial reporting, digitalization and institutional coordination. It also includes work toward an integrated financial management information system.

This may appear technical.

In reality, it is fundamental.

If a government cannot accurately know how much money it receives, where it spends it and what results are produced, it becomes difficult to manage reconstruction effectively.

The collapse of public revenues

The World Bank notes that Syria's government revenue collection fell from close to 20 percent of GDP before the conflict to less than 5 percent, reflecting the contraction of oil and tax revenues and weaknesses in customs collection.

This creates a fundamental problem.

The government needs to provide services.

But its fiscal capacity is severely constrained.

Rebuilding roads, schools, hospitals and electricity networks requires enormous resources.

At the same time, households and businesses have limited capacity to absorb higher taxes.

The state therefore needs a gradual strategy for rebuilding revenue collection without undermining economic recovery.

Tax administration and economic formalization

A modern tax system is not simply about collecting more money.

It is about establishing predictable rules.

Businesses need to know their tax obligations.

Citizens need to understand how taxes are calculated.

The administration needs reliable information.

Digital systems can reduce administrative costs and improve transparency.

The IMF has identified revenue mobilization and tax administration as important components of its technical assistance to Syria.

The long-term objective should be a tax system capable of financing essential public services while encouraging productive private-sector activity.

The challenge of economic statistics

One of Syria's less visible problems is the weakness of economic data.

Years of conflict disrupted statistical systems and the production of reliable economic information.

The World Bank explicitly notes that official economic data remain limited and of uneven reliability.

This matters because governments cannot manage effectively without knowing what is happening.

How many people are employed?

How many businesses are operating?

What is the actual inflation rate?

Which regions are recovering?

Where is poverty concentrated?

What sectors are growing?

How many people are returning?

What is happening to agricultural production?

These questions require reliable statistics.

Data as an instrument of reconstruction

Syria therefore needs to rebuild its statistical infrastructure alongside its physical infrastructure.

A modern national statistical system could collect information on:

Employment.

Prices.

Household income.

Business activity.

Industrial production.

Agriculture.

Trade.

Migration.

Poverty.

Education.

Health.

And regional development.

Digital technology can make this process faster and more transparent.

Reliable data would also help international donors determine where assistance is most needed.

Rebuilding the banking sector

Economic reconstruction cannot progress normally without a functioning financial system.

Businesses need payment systems.

Investors need banking services.

Citizens need secure savings mechanisms.

The government needs modern financial infrastructure.

The IMF has identified urgent banking-sector rehabilitation as one of the priorities for Syria, alongside stronger anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing safeguards.

The objective is not simply to reopen banks.

It is to rebuild a financial system capable of supporting productive investment.

Restoring confidence in banks

Confidence will be particularly important.

After years of conflict, sanctions, currency instability and economic disruption, citizens and businesses need confidence that financial institutions can operate reliably.

A functioning banking sector could facilitate:

Domestic payments.

International trade.

Business investment.

Savings.

Remittances.

Credit.

And government financial operations.

Without these mechanisms, much economic activity remains dependent on cash and informal arrangements.

The private sector as a driver of recovery

The Syrian state cannot rebuild the entire economy alone.

The private sector will have to play a major role.

The IMF has stressed the importance of creating conditions for the private sector to lead development and growth.

This means improving the business environment.

Companies need:

Predictable regulations.

Access to finance.

Reliable electricity.

Transportation.

Digital infrastructure.

Property rights.

Transparent taxation.

And functioning courts.

The objective should be to move gradually from an economy dominated by emergency assistance toward one in which productive businesses create employment and investment.

Small businesses and local recovery

Large investors will attract considerable attention during reconstruction.

But small businesses may have a more immediate impact on communities.

A bakery employs local workers.

A workshop provides technical services.

A small agricultural enterprise creates seasonal employment.

A transport company connects producers to markets.

A technology company can provide digital services.

A construction company can participate in rebuilding neighborhoods.

The recovery of small and medium-sized enterprises can therefore become one of the fastest ways to restore economic activity.

Jobs must be at the center

Syria's reconstruction will require millions of workers across different sectors.

But temporary construction jobs are not enough.

The country needs sustainable employment.

The International Labour Organization has been working with Syrian institutions and social partners on the design of a National Public Works Programme intended to create jobs while restoring community infrastructure.

This approach is significant because it connects two objectives:

employment and reconstruction.

Instead of treating them separately, public works can create immediate income while restoring roads, public spaces, water systems and other community assets.

Young people and skills

Young Syrians will be central to the country's future.

Many have experienced interrupted education, unemployment or displacement.

Others acquired skills outside Syria that could become valuable during reconstruction.

A national recovery strategy should therefore connect:

Education.

Vocational training.

Employment.

Entrepreneurship.

And reconstruction.

Training programs should respond to real economic demand.

Potential areas include:

Construction.

Engineering.

Electricity.

Renewable energy.

Water management.

Information technology.

Healthcare.

Agriculture.

Logistics.

And public administration.

Returning Syrians and human capital

The return of refugees could become an important source of human capital.

The IMF reported that approximately 1.5 million refugees had returned by 2026, contributing to the recovery in domestic demand.

But return alone does not guarantee economic reintegration.

Returning families need housing.

Children need schools.

Workers need jobs.

Businesses need financing.

Communities need services.

Professional qualifications may need recognition.

The return process should therefore be connected to local development programs.

Regional disparities

Syria's recovery will not be geographically uniform.

Different regions suffered different levels of destruction.

Economic structures also differ.

Some areas depend heavily on agriculture.

Others on industry.

Others on trade or services.

Major cities face different challenges from rural areas.

The World Bank and IMF both emphasize that Syria's recovery remains uneven across regions.

This means that a single national economic policy will not be sufficient.

Regional development strategies will be necessary.

Agriculture and rural development

Agriculture can provide employment and food security while supporting rural communities.

But the sector has suffered from years of conflict and, more recently, severe drought conditions.

The recovery of rainfall in 2026 has improved agricultural prospects, according to the IMF, but the sector remains vulnerable.

Reconstruction of irrigation systems, rural roads, storage facilities and agricultural markets could therefore generate both economic and social benefits.

Agriculture should also be linked to food processing.

A farmer produces wheat, fruit or vegetables.

A local business processes them.

Another company packages them.

A transport company distributes them.

Retailers sell them.

This creates a wider rural economic chain.

Electricity and essential services

Reliable electricity is one of the foundations of economic recovery.

Without electricity, factories cannot operate efficiently.

Hospitals cannot function normally.

Schools face difficulties.

Businesses incur higher costs.

Digital companies cannot work reliably.

The World Bank notes that improved electricity provision is already supporting Syria's economic recovery.

Rebuilding the electricity sector should therefore be considered both an infrastructure priority and an economic policy.

Public administration and digital transformation

The modernization of Syrian public administration could provide an opportunity to introduce digital systems from the beginning.

Instead of rebuilding old paper-based procedures, institutions can gradually move toward:

Digital budgets.

Electronic procurement.

Digital tax administration.

Business registration.

Online public services.

Digital land records.

Electronic payments.

Public expenditure monitoring.

And integrated government databases.

This could reduce administrative costs and increase transparency.

Professionalizing the civil service

Public administration cannot be rebuilt only through technology.

People remain essential.

Syria needs civil servants with expertise in:

Finance.

Procurement.

Statistics.

Digital systems.

Urban planning.

Public health.

Education.

Infrastructure.

Agriculture.

And economic policy.

Training and professional development should therefore become a major part of institutional reconstruction.

The World Bank's public financial management project explicitly includes capacity development and professionalization of government staff.

Transparency and accountability

Reconstruction will involve enormous amounts of money.

This creates significant risks if financial management is weak.

Citizens and international partners will need confidence that reconstruction funds are used for their intended purposes.

Transparency mechanisms can include:

Public procurement databases.

Published budgets.

Audited government accounts.

Digital expenditure tracking.

Clear tender procedures.

Independent oversight.

And public reporting of reconstruction projects.

The World Bank explicitly links stronger public financial management with transparency, accountability and the ability of the Syrian state to gain the confidence of citizens and the international community.

Rebuilding the relationship between citizen and state

Perhaps the most important institutional challenge is trust.

A state is not simply a collection of ministries.

It is a relationship between institutions and citizens.

People need to believe that public services are accessible.

Businesses need to believe that rules are predictable.

Investors need to believe that contracts are respected.

Citizens need to believe that public funds are managed responsibly.

International organizations need to believe that assistance is properly administered.

The United Nations' 2026 analysis places trust-building at the center of Syria's transition toward recovery and long-term development.

From humanitarian assistance to development

For many years, international engagement in Syria was dominated by humanitarian needs.

Those needs remain significant.

But the country now faces an additional challenge:

How can humanitarian assistance gradually connect with economic recovery and development?

Food assistance can protect families.

But agricultural investment can restore livelihoods.

Cash assistance can help households survive.

But employment programs can provide longer-term income.

Emergency electricity support can keep services running.

But energy investment can create sustainable capacity.

The transition therefore requires a combination of humanitarian protection and development investment.

International support

Syria cannot finance its reconstruction needs alone.

The World Bank's estimate of US$216 billion illustrates the scale of the challenge.

International support will therefore be necessary.

But external assistance needs effective domestic institutions.

Donors need reliable financial reporting.

Development institutions need credible procurement systems.

Investors need predictable regulations.

International partners need clear national priorities.

Institutional reform is therefore not separate from international assistance.

It is a condition for making that assistance effective.

A new economic model

Syria's post-conflict economy will need to be more diversified and productive.

The country has opportunities in:

Agriculture.

Food processing.

Manufacturing.

Energy.

Renewable energy.

Tourism.

Transport.

Logistics.

Construction.

Digital services.

And regional trade.

But these sectors require functioning institutions and infrastructure.

The objective should therefore be to create an environment in which Syrian entrepreneurs and investors can participate actively in reconstruction.

Reconstruction should create local value

One of the most important principles should be local economic participation.

If an international company rebuilds a major project, local companies can become suppliers.

Local workers can receive training.

Syrian engineers can participate.

Local businesses can provide transport and services.

Universities can contribute research.

Vocational schools can prepare workers.

This creates a broader economic multiplier.

Reconstruction becomes more than expenditure.

It becomes an engine of economic development.

The risk of reconstruction without institutions

There is a major danger in focusing exclusively on physical reconstruction.

New buildings can be constructed without creating efficient institutions.

Roads can be rebuilt without improving transport management.

Hospitals can be renovated without adequate staffing.

Government offices can be reconstructed without modern administrative systems.

This would produce physical recovery without institutional recovery.

For Syria, the two processes must advance together.

What should be rebuilt first?

The answer cannot be simply "everything."

Resources are limited.

Priorities should be based on economic and social impact.

Essential services should receive attention.

Electricity.

Water.

Healthcare.

Education.

Transport.

Public administration.

Financial systems.

And local economic infrastructure.

At the same time, regions should be assessed according to their specific needs.

Measuring the success of reconstruction

Syria will need a comprehensive system of recovery indicators.

Not only:

How many buildings were rebuilt?

But also:

How many jobs were created?

How many businesses reopened?

How many people returned to productive employment?

How much electricity became available?

How many schools and hospitals function effectively?

How much agricultural production recovered?

How many new businesses were registered?

How much private investment was mobilized?

How efficiently were public funds managed?

And how much did household welfare improve?

These indicators would provide a much more complete picture of recovery.

The next stage: building a functioning state

Syria's transition is ultimately a state-building challenge.

The country must restore:

Public institutions.

Economic management.

Financial systems.

Infrastructure.

Social services.

Professional administration.

Reliable statistics.

And public trust.

The process will take years.

There is no single reform that can solve all these problems.

The recovery will depend on sequencing reforms carefully and connecting them to the daily needs of citizens.

Conclusion: rebuilding the state is the foundation of economic recovery

Syria's post-Assad transition has created an opportunity to rebuild the country's economy and institutions after years of conflict.

But the scale of the challenge is extraordinary.

The World Bank estimates reconstruction costs at approximately US$216 billion, while public revenues have fallen dramatically and economic data remain limited.

At the same time, there are signs of economic recovery.

The IMF reports stronger activity, returning refugees, improved electricity provision, recovering agriculture, higher trade and services activity, and increased investment interest, while emphasizing that poverty remains widespread and recovery is uneven.

This creates a historic opportunity—but also a complex institutional challenge.

Syria cannot rebuild its economy without rebuilding the capacity of the state.

It cannot rebuild the state without rebuilding public administration.

It cannot rebuild public administration without professional staff and reliable data.

And it cannot achieve sustainable development without restoring confidence among citizens, businesses and international partners.

The priorities are therefore interconnected:

Build effective institutions.

Strengthen public financial management.

Restore reliable economic data.

Rehabilitate the banking system.

Improve essential services.

Support SMEs and local businesses.

Create employment for young people.

Connect reconstruction with regional development.

Attract productive private investment.

And above all:

Rebuild trust between the citizen and the state.

Syria's reconstruction should not be understood simply as a massive construction project.

It should be understood as an opportunity to create a more capable state, a more diversified economy and stronger local communities.

The ultimate measure of success will not be the amount of money spent or the number of buildings reconstructed.

It will be whether Syrians can once again live in communities where public institutions function, businesses can invest, young people can find work, essential services are available and citizens can have confidence in the future.

The rebuilding of Syria therefore begins not only with bricks and infrastructure, but with institutions, economic opportunity and trust.

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Keywords: Syria economy, Syria reconstruction, Syria after Assad, Syria transition, Syria public administration, Syria state institutions, Syria economic recovery, Syria development, Syria jobs, Syria employment, Syria private sector, Syria SMEs, Syria banking sector, Syria public finance, Syria infrastructure, Syria refugees, Syria investment, Syria digital transformation, Syria governance, Syria World Bank, Syria IMF, Syria development

Sources: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, International Labour Organization, UNDP.

ATEP MED – Arabic Digital Center for Media and Development
Written and published by Mohamed Chaieb
atepmed@gmail.com